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The Uncertainties of Educating a Preschooler with 
Special Needs: Who Makes the Important 
Determinations? And, Who Should? 
Kathryn A. Kuhlenberg 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Quinn is a bright, outgoing, fun-loving three-and-a-half-year-old little 
boy.1 Like most children his age, he is enrolled in a preschool program that 
is meant to prepare him for kindergarten.2 Quinn had been attending his 
privately run preschool program for about a year when Quinn’s teachers 
began to notice some behavioral, sensitivity, and anxiety characteristics that 
alarmed them. They referred Quinn and his parents to the local education 
agency (LEA), more commonly known as a “school district,” for an 
evaluation. The LEA concluded that Quinn qualified to receive services 
through its state-run and federally funded special education program. The 
LEA outlined the services Quinn should receive in his individual education 
plan (IEP). These services were meant to close the developmental gap 
between Quinn and his peers. 
Quinn’s parents were concerned for their son, but they were very happy 
that he would now be able to get the services he needed. They contacted the 
school to work out the logistics of Quinn’s services, but were instead 
confronted with a troubling choice. The school informed Quinn’s parents 
                                                        
 Kathryn taught in integrated preschools for more than eight years. She was also the preschool 
special education teacher for a school district in Colorado and the Child Find Coordinator for a 
county in Colorado prior to attending law school. Personal experiences and frustrations drove 
the creation of this piece. 
1 The author created this scenario based on personal experiences as an illustrative 
example. 
2 See COLLEGEBOARD, http://completionagenda.collegeboard.org/3-5-year-olds-enrolled-
preschool-programs (last visited Nov. 21, 2010); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i) 
(2006) (referring to preschool children participating in “appropriate activities”). 
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that in order to receive the services outlined in his IEP, he would need to 
leave his current preschool to attend the district-run preschool. Quinn’s 
parents were concerned for their son, as Quinn had experienced many 
challenges adjusting to his current preschool, but after a year he was 
comfortable and happy with his teachers and peers and, most importantly, 
making progress socially, emotionally, and academically. Moreover, 
Quinn’s first preschool was specifically chosen for him based on his 
parents’ preferences and views on what would be the best option for their 
son’s education. Quinn’s parents had looked at the district preschool in the 
past and chose not to enroll Quinn for a number of reasons—but they gave 
it one more chance and took Quinn to spend the day to see how he liked it. 
Quinn was anxious for most of the day. It was very difficult for the teachers 
to communicate with him and for him to connect with the teachers or his 
peers. For most of the time, he hid under the tables. Needless to say, 
Quinn’s parents did not think it was a good fit for their son or their family. 
Quinn’s parents now face an enormous dilemma: Do they send Quinn to 
a new school that they do not really like and where he is uncomfortable in 
order to receive the services that he needs? Or, do they forgo special 
education services and keep Quinn in his current setting—one that was 
specifically chosen for him and in which he is thriving? 
There is a classic and inherent tension in state-run education systems 
between the rights of parents to direct the education of their children and the 
rights of the state to direct the education of its citizens. 3  Compulsory 
education laws and a few major US Supreme Court decisions 4  have 
addressed this tension as it applies to most of the school-age population,5 
but these laws and decisions do not typically extend to preschool education. 
                                                        
3 See AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN DEWEY, 
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (New York: WLC Books 2009) (1916). 
4 See cases cited infra notes 42, 50, 58. 
5 See id.; see also Melodye Bush, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, Compulsory School 
Age Requirements (Apr. 2009), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/80/44/8044.pdf. 
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Because of this, parents almost exclusively control the education of their 
preschool-aged children with little or no state interference.6  Even when 
there are laws that address preschool education, there is no clear direction 
for how to address issues unique to preschool settings. 
For example, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA), the federal government mandates that schools receiving federal 
funds identify and serve all children ages three to five who qualify for 
special education services.7 The IDEA also requires that all eligible children 
be provided a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least 
restrictive environment (LRE), which means that the child should be 
educated with nondisabled peers to the greatest extent possible.8 However, 
determining the LRE for a preschooler is a difficult task because there is no 
“typical” education setting for preschoolers equal to that of the primary and 
secondary levels.9 Instead, there are several different preschool settings that 
may adequately prepare children for kindergarten. 10  In addition, when 
determining the LRE for a preschooler who qualifies for special education 
services, there is uncertainty as to whether the parents or the school should 
be making such a determination. These issues create uncertainty as to how 
situations like the one faced by Quinn’s parents should be resolved. 
                                                        
6 See infra notes 152-53. 
7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (2006) (“A State is eligible for assistance under this 
subchapter for a fiscal year if the State submits a plan that provides assurances to the 
Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that the State 
meets each of the following conditions”); id. § 1412(a)(1) (“A free appropriate public 
education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the 
ages of 3 and 21, inclusive”); id. § 1412(a)(5) (“To the maximum extent appropriate, 
children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled.”). 
8 See id. § 1412(a)(5). 
9 See generally Theresa M. Demonte, Finding The Least Restrictive Environment For 
Preschoolers Under The IDEA: An Analysis And Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 157 (2010). 
10 See Alison Gopnik, Op-Ed., Your Baby is Smarter than You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2009, at WK10. 
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Preschool special education is fraught with uncertainties like those 
presented above. As a result, parents and schools inevitably must face and 
make many tough decisions. Specifically, what is the LRE and who makes 
that determination? Parents have retained much freedom of choice in the 
education of their children at the preschool level, but if the school is solely 
responsible for determining the LRE, then parents are necessarily stripped 
of the right to choose how, when, where, and if their child attends 
preschool. Does acceptance of an IEP remove from the parent that freedom 
of choice? And, if so, should it? Early childhood education and intervention 
is pivotal in the development of children and can have a huge impact on 
children’s later educational success, especially for special education 
students.11  Because early childhood education can have such a massive 
effect on the individual, the family, and the school, it does not make sense 
to give either the state or the parent total control. Thus, Congress can best 
address this issue by amending the IDEA to include either a clear set of 
standards for determining when a specific preschool will be suitable for 
delivering special education services or a requirement that states adopt clear 
standards that do the same. 
This article addresses some of these ambiguities and explores the tension 
between parents and the state at the preschool level. First, it presents and 
analyzes competing theories regarding parent versus state control of 
education, with a broad, more philosophical focus. Second, it provides a 
brief history of the federal system of special education in the United States, 
focusing specifically on the three- to five-year-old preschool age group. 
Then, it provides a more in-depth discussion, using relevant information 
and arguments from the previous sections, of the special education issues 
                                                        
11 See Leslie J. Calman & Linda Tarr-Whelan, Early Childhood Education for All: A 
Wise Investment (Apr. 2005), 
http://web.mit.edu/workplacecenter/docs/Full%20Report.pdf (recommendations arising 
from “The Economic Impacts of Child Care and Early Education: Financing Solutions for 
the Future,” a conference sponsored by Legal Momentum’s Family Initiative and the 
MIT Workplace Center 2005). 
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that arise in the unique system of preschool. The article also addresses the 
importance of early childhood education, especially in the special education 
context, to make clear that a solution to the issues presented is both 
necessary and desirable. Finally, it makes informed recommendations on 
how the IDEA should be amended to account for both parental and state 
interests in order to clear up the uncertainties that currently exist. 
II. WHO SHOULD DIRECT AND CONTROL EDUCATION? 
This fundamental question lies at the heart of Quinn’s dilemma. As 
federal and state governments have become increasingly involved in the 
education process, this question has become more prevalent and complex. 
First, there exists a philosophical argument regarding the ever-present 
tension between parents and the state in controlling education. This 
argument is especially applicable in democratic states because of the 
extreme importance of education in a democratic society. There is also a 
legal argument regarding the right to care, custody, and control of one’s 
child—as recognized by the federal judiciary—and the interaction of this 
right with public education to consider. Although neither the philosophy nor 
the cases are directly tied to preschool special education, each illustrates the 
tension between the rights of parents and the state in directing education. 
The philosophical argument analyzes this tension in the broadest sense 
because it considers the ideal balance for a democratic state. The cases and 
legal arguments illustrate that courts can address controversies as they arise 
to provide relief for individuals, and sometimes classes of people, through 
which common law and precedents are created. But, the philosophical and 
legal arguments are not sufficient to resolve the ambiguities that continue to 
exist. The common law and legal precedents are inconsistent, and 
judgments sometimes directly contradict one another. Similarly, great 
philosophers and legal minds have been unable to discern static boundaries 
590 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
regarding where the parents’ rights end and where the states’ rights begin, 
and the debate has been a constant fixture in the education community.12 
A. The Importance of Education in a Democratic Society—A Philosophical 
Argument 
The philosophical argument regarding the need and importance of 
education in a democratic society can be traced back to the roots of 
democracy itself: ancient Greece. In fact, the Spartans were one of the first 
societies to impose a system of public education on their youth.13  The 
Spartan government removed boys from the home at age seven to live and 
learn in the public education system 14  because the Spartan education 
system’s goal was to create a “well-drilled military machine composed of 
soldiers who were ‘obedient to the word of command, capable of enduring 
hardships and victories in battle.’”15 Philosopher Amy Gutmann describes 
such a system as a “family state.”16 A family state is one in which the state 
completely and totally controls the education of all children in order to 
guarantee societal harmony.17 Under this theory, “unless children learn to 
associate their own good with the social good, a peaceful and prosperous 
society will be impossible” to maintain.18 This theory, and those that follow, 
rest on the notion that education is imperative for a healthy democracy 
because the electorate must be able to make an educated decision and 
discern among competing ideas for a democracy to properly function. This 
                                                        
12 MITCHELL L. YELL, THE LAW AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 62 (Pearson Educ., Inc. ed., 
2d ed. 2006). 
13 Sparta Reconsidered Education, ELYSIUMGATES.COM, 
http://elysiumgates.com/~helena/Education.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2011). 
14 The Legacy of Ancient Greece, Spartan Education, CSUPOMONA.EDU, 
http://www.csupomona.edu/~plin/ls201/greece4.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2011). 
15 Id. (quoting PETER LEVI, THE GREEK WORLD 91 (1991)). 
16 GUTMANN, supra note 3, at 22–28. This type of system was first recognized by Plato. 
Plato supports such a system, and it is from Plato’s writings that Gutmann makes her 
argument. 
17 See id. 
18 Id. at 23. 
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connection between education and democracy has received much attention 
from philosophical education scholars, such as John Dewey, 19  and its 
importance is the topic of much scholarship and thought.20 In the “family 
state,” children are taught that the current society is the best option, so when 
faced with a decision among competing ideals in democratic elections, the 
children will most highly value their current system and vote accordingly. 
But, this theory has some drawbacks. Because the United States is a 
heterogeneous society, it would be almost impossible for the state to teach 
only one set of morals and values, or to even determine what would 
constitute such a set. Flowing from this quandary, it would also be nearly 
impossible to implement such a system unless the state was able to remove 
children from their parents’ custody because, as part of an established 
society, most parents already have set morals and beliefs that they would 
like to pass on to their children.21 Moreover, such an invasive form of 
education would almost certainly be an encroachment on parents’ rights 
because the state’s morals and values are probably not the same as the 
parents’ in many instances. Therefore, the “family state” would be neither a 
desirable nor a practical model for most families or the states. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Gutmann describes a theory known 
as the “state of families.”22 This theory solidly rests on the presumption that 
parents will always do what is in the best interest of their children, and thus 
places total control of education in the hands of parents.23 In doing so, it 
                                                        
19 See DEWEY, supra note 3. 
20 See generally MICHAEL APPLE, ASS’N FOR SUPERVISION & CURRICULUM, 
DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLS, (June 1995); Edward L. Glaeser, Want a Stronger Democracy? 
Invest in Education, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/want-a-stronger-democracy-invest-in-
education/. 
21 APPLE, supra note 20, at 25. 
22 See id. at 28–33. This theory is recognized and supported by John Locke. Other 
Catholic theologians also support this theory, as they believe the family is the most 
important actor within a child’s life. 
23 Id. at 28. 
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permits “parents to predispose their children, through education, to choose a 
way of life consistent with their familial heritage.”24 Various current issues 
and events highlight what some see as the dangers of such an education 
style. For example, consider the recent interest in and investigation of 
Mormon compounds. The lifestyle lived and preached at these compounds 
illustrates how a “state of families” system would look and operate because 
the children are exclusively educated by their immediate family and those 
who have identical beliefs.25 The children in these Mormon compounds are 
essentially isolated from exposure to competing ideas and lifestyles. So, 
although this theory is appealing because most parents cherish the 
opportunity to share their wisdom, knowledge, and lifestyle with their 
children, it also has extreme consequences in a democratic society 
dependent upon a well-educated electorate that can discern among 
competing notions and ideas. 
Another theory, the “state of individuals,” attempts to balance these 
interests.26 Gutmann describes this theory as one that allows children to 
make their own choices without the influence of people who have already 
had the opportunity to live their own lives and make their own 
determinations.27 This theory also responds to the criticisms of the “family 
state” and the “state of families” theories by elucidating two goals: 
opportunity and neutrality.28  Opportunity means that children should be 
presented with all options of what a good life looks like and must be given 
every opportunity to choose freely among them.29 Neutrality means that 
                                                        
24 Id. 
25 Miguel Bastillo, 400 Kids Removed From Compound, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 2008, 
at A4. 
26 See GUTMANN, supra note 3, at 15. John Stewart Mill wrote extensively on “the state 
of individuals,” and described this theory as the best system of education. This theory is 
also supported by more current philosophers who cite to similar arguments of Kant and 
Bentham. 
27 See id. at 33–34. 
28 Id. at 34. 
29 Id. 
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throughout this process, children must be totally insulated from all cultural 
biases and prejudices.30 The essence of this theory is that children should be 
exposed to any and all notions, ideas, and ideals, and that exposure should 
be done in such a way that does not impart any bias towards one or another. 
This sounds ideal because it would allow children to develop critical 
analytical skills and shield them from stereotypes, which allows for a more 
diverse and accepting society. However, it is nearly impossible to 
implement such a system, and it may not even be wise to do so because 
both parents and the state “have a legitimate interest in passing some of 
their most salient values onto their children.”31 
Finally, Gutmann describes her own theory that attempts to account for 
the shortcomings of the others: the “democratic state of education.”32 The 
premise of this theory is that each of the other theories contains a partial 
truth.33 Although none of the theories are sufficient on their own to establish 
independent educational authority, a combination would capture the 
benefits or truths of each. Therefore, the “democratic state of education” 
theory “recognizes that educational authority must be shared among 
parents, citizens, and professional educators even though such sharing does 
not guarantee that power will be wedded to knowledge, that parents can 
successfully pass their prejudices on to their children, or that education will 
be neutral among competing conceptions.”34 
Gutmann emphasizes that this sharing of authority is critical in 
democratic states because it allows parents to predispose their children to 
particular morals and values, but does not insulate children from competing 
points of view.35  This teaches them to critically analyze and deliberate 
                                                        
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 37. 
32 See id. at 41–47. 
33 Id. at 42. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 44. 
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among competing ideas.36 Moreover, this authority sharing appreciates the 
state’s desire to impart onto children a preference for democracy so that the 
electorate understands and exercises its democratic responsibilities.37 This 
theory seems to be an ideal compromise between the competing interests, 
and, conceptually, it is. However, giving practical effect to this theory has 
proven difficult because parents and the state are continually struggling for 
additional influence and control over education. 
The philosophical debate among these competing theories provides a 
framework for analyzing and criticizing the varying jurisprudence that has 
developed in the attempt to resolve this ever-present tension to which “there 
is no simple solution.”38 Although preschool education may not seem to be 
directly implicated by this discussion, it is. The tension between parental 
control and state control begins at birth, and if the state is allowed to 
exercise more control early on in the child’s life, it has an even greater 
opportunity to impact the child. 
B. The Constitutional Right of the Parent to the Care, Custody, and Control 
of One’s Child—A Legal Perspective 
The Federal Constitution does not grant children a right to education, nor 
does it explicitly grant parents a right to control the education of their 
children. Rather, the power to regulate and control systems of education is 
derived from the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution.39 Each state’s 
constitution grants the right to education, which is further augmented by 
state compulsory education laws.40 Thus, ultimate control over systems of 
education is reserved to the fifty states. States have the power to regulate 
and control their own systems of education, and at times these regulations 
                                                        
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 45. 
38 Id. at 32. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
40 See MICHAEL REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS (2009); Bush, supra note 5. 
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conflict with the desires of parents. In addressing this conflict, the US 
Supreme Court has determined that the states cannot regulate systems of 
education any way they see fit because parents have constitutional rights to 
direct the care, custody, and control of their children.41 However, these 
rights are not explicitly granted. Instead, they are gleaned from the rights 
that are specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights and those that are 
natural to all persons. 
One of the first major challenges to the power of states to control 
education came in Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 42  The Oregon state 
legislature passed a compulsory attendance law that required parents to send 
children to public school or face a misdemeanor conviction. 43  The US 
Supreme Court determined that by requiring students to attend public 
schools, Oregon infringed upon parental rights that are protected by the US 
Constitution. Despite the states’ legitimate interest in regulating education, 
the Court held that “the child is not the mere creature of the State; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for future obligations.”44 The real issue 
in Pierce was not about requiring education through compulsory attendance 
laws, but about requiring education within the public school system, which 
would eliminate religious education institutions like the Society of Sisters. 
Eliminating these institutions would essentially give the states a monopoly 
over education, which, in conjunction with compulsory attendance laws, 
would severely limit a parent’s opportunity to direct a child’s education. 
The Court did not decide, and arguments were not made, on other issues 
of regulation, including the state’s right to 
regulate all schools, to inspect supervise and examine them, their 
teachers and pupils; to require that all children attend some school, 
                                                        
41 See infra text accompanying notes 42–66; U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
42 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
43 Id. at 530. 
44 Id. at 535. 
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that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic 
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship 
must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly 
inimical to the public welfare.45 
The Court was also unclear about exactly where in the Constitution this 
right is derived because the right is not explicitly articulated. Some scholars 
posit that the right is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee 
of liberty, while others maintain that the right is protected by the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech or religion.46 
Finally, consider an alternative analysis of the outcome of Pierce. Some 
scholars believe that the decision in Pierce actually rests not on the 
individual rights of parents, but on the desire to limit the reach of the 
states.47 These scholars assert that if states monopolize education, then there 
is no competition, and the states have the unfettered, and possibly 
dangerous, “ability to mold the young.”48 Thus, the decision is not based on 
the existence of a parental right, but on the desire to limit possible state 
prerogatives to indoctrinate children.49 If this analysis is correct, it further 
emphasizes the tension that exists between states and parents, and is 
evidence of the need for controlling law that accounts for this tension by 
providing clear standards. 
Around the same time period that Pierce was decided, the US Supreme 
Court heard two other cases dealing with state regulation of education: 
Meyer v. Nebraska and Farrington v. Tokushige.50 In both of these cases, 
the state attempted to regulate which languages could be used for 
instruction in schools. In Meyer, Nebraska outlawed instruction in German 
                                                        
45 Id. at 534. 
46 MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 16 (4th ed. 2002). 
47 Mark G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward the Theory of Government 
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 888–91 (1979). 
48 Id. at 891. 
49 Id. 
50 Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 290 (1927); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 
397 (1923). 
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to any child that had not passed the eighth grade, and any teacher 
instructing in German would be guilty of a misdemeanor.51 After Robert 
Meyer, a teacher at a private school, was convicted under this law, he 
challenged the statute’s validity. 52  The Court held that the regulation 
interfered with the teacher’s right to instruct, the parents’ protected right to 
“control the education of their own,” and the students’ protected right to 
opportunities for acquiring knowledge.53  The Court applied the rational 
basis test, 54  determining that the regulation was “arbitrary and without 
reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the state” and, as 
such, invalid under the liberty guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.55 
Farrington involved a similar situation in the then-Territory of Hawaii. 
Because the territory was not yet an independent state, the Court reached its 
decision under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied 
to the federal government.56 Each of these decisions further supported the 
parental right first recognized in Pierce, and each gave weight to the notion 
that this parental right extends to the education of the child. 
                                                        
51 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397 (outlawing instruction in popular languages such as Spanish 
and French, but not outlawing ancient or dead languages). 
52 Id. at 396. 
53 Id. at 399–402. 
54 The rational basis test requires only that the regulation in question is rationally related 
to a governmental interest. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152–53 (1938) (“[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
55 Id. at 403. 
56 The Hawaiian legislature passed Act 30, which regulated the teaching of foreign 
languages. The US Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s holding that the Act 
violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court explained that the 
Act was an unnecessary intrusion on the rights of individuals, and there was no policy 
justification to support such an intrusion. Farrington, 273 U.S. at 47. 
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Most recently, challenges regarding parental rights to control the 
education of one’s child have centered on religious convictions.57 These 
challenges resemble Pierce, but there are also marked differences because 
there is no question of the mere existence of parochial schools in these 
cases. Instead, the issue focuses on exposing children to ideas different from 
those of their religious upbringing. These cases are reminiscent of 
Gutmann’s “state of families” theory because the major argument made in 
these cases is that parents, not the state, should control instilling morals and 
values, particularly religious ones, in their children. 
The US Supreme Court made one of its more famous decisions, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, nearly fifty years after its initial recognition of parental 
rights in Pierce. 58  In Yoder, Amish parents challenged the state’s 
compulsory education law beyond eighth grade, arguing that it violated 
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.59 In a split decision, the Court 
ultimately concluded that the state’s interest in educating children did not 
outweigh the parents’ interest in directing the education of their children.60 
Throughout its opinion, the Court struggled to balance the competing 
interests of parents and the state, even though it clearly expressed that a 
state’s interest in educating its citizens “ranks at the very apex of the 
function of the State.”61 On one hand, the Court recognized that parental 
interests in directing the religious upbringing of children have a “high place 
in our society” and that religious freedom has been “zealously protected, 
sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high 
importance.” 62  On the other hand, the Court also recognized that 
                                                        
57 See Michael E. Lechliter, The Free Exercise Of Religion And Public Schools: The 
Implications Of Hybrid Rights On The Religious Upbringing Of Children, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 2209 (2005). 
58 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
59 Id. at 207. 
60 Id. at 234, 236–37. 
61 Id. at 213. 
62 Id. at 214. 
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compulsory education laws, like the one at issue in Wisconsin, 
“demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society” and supported the state’s position.63 
Finally, and most recently, in Troxel v. Granville, the US Supreme Court 
again recognized and reiterated the parental right that it determined was 
involved in all of these cases. 64  Although the case was not related to 
education, a plurality of the Court espoused the opinion that “the interest of 
the parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”65 
Thus, this parental right is now clearly a constitutional right because the 
Court has consistently recognized that the right exists and is protected under 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
However, there is still much debate about what the right entails. Recall 
Quinn’s educational dilemma. Based on these decisions, his parents have a 
constitutional right in his care, custody, and control. And, it is likely that the 
state has an interest in seeing that Quinn receives the services that he needs. 
However, states do not have compulsory preschool attendance laws, so it is 
difficult to define the interests of the state.66 Regardless as to how the state’s 
interest is defined, it must be weighed against the parental interest to 
determine whether or not the state can compel Quinn’s parents to send him 
to a particular school. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The IDEA and the protections and rights it provides did not always exist. 
It was the result of generations of hard-fought advocacy by parents and 
                                                        
63 Id. at 238. 
64 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 71 (2000) (finding that parental rights did not extend 
to grandparents after paternal grandparents sought visitation rights after the death of their 
son, the father of the children). 
65 Id. at 65. 
66 See Bush, supra note 5. 
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educators, responsive state and federal judiciaries and legislatures, and a 
political climate that made the nation ripe for change. It is important to 
understand the genesis of this movement to fully appreciate the purposes of 
the current protections afforded to parents and their children and the 
emphasis that has been placed on early childhood and family-centered 
approaches throughout the evolution of our current system of special 
education. It is with this evolution of the law in mind that current issues 
must be considered if they are to be thoroughly and accurately assessed. 
A. The National Campaign for Special Education 
Many people throughout the United States believe that education is a 
right that has been granted to every child by the federal government.67 
However, the US Constitution does not explicitly grant this right; it is, 
instead, a power reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.68 One 
reason for this confusion is that all fifty states currently have compulsory 
education laws that require children to attend school. 69  Although some 
states enacted compulsory attendance laws as early as the 1850s, children 
with disabilities were consistently excluded from the education system.70 
This intentional exclusion led parents to begin affirmatively fighting for 
their children’s right to be educated.71 
In the early 1900s, parents began a long battle with governmental 
agencies at both the state and federal levels to ensure that systems of public 
education no longer excluded children with disabilities.72 Parents were on 
the frontlines of the battle because they witnessed and experienced the 
                                                        
67 See generally YELL, supra note 12. 
68 Id.; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 93 S.Ct. 1278 
(1973). Many states have also recognized an affirmative right to education under state 
constitutions. These rights have been established through individual challenges through 
what is known as educational adequacy litigation. See REBELL, supra note 40. 
69 See Bush, supra note 5. 
70 YELL, supra note 12, at 62. 
71 Id. at 63. 
72 Id. 
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impact that receiving little or no education had on their children.73 The 
government’s first major response was the White House Conference of 
1910.74 The goal of this conference was to “define and establish remedial 
programs for children with disabilities or special needs,” and it resulted in a 
significant increase in the number of special segregated classes and support 
services within public schools.75 
While segregated classrooms were less isolated than completely 
independent institutions, there remained a major problem: children with 
disabilities and special needs were still totally segregated from mainstream 
classrooms.76 Moreover, support for special education services was waning 
in the face of both the financial ramifications of the Great Depression and 
the increasingly prevalent desire to establish and maintain an orderly 
citizenry that was not accepting of different behaviors and abilities.77 As a 
result, students with disabilities were further segregated from the 
mainstream student population and ended up in environments that were 
more similar to custodial placements in institutions than to classroom 
settings.78 
Again, parents began to fight back. In 1933, five mothers created the first 
special education advocacy group in Ohio and had great success in 
advocating for their children within the school system.79 Following this 
model, small groups began to spring up throughout the states in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and finally national organizations began to assemble in the 
1950s.80 The National Association for Retarded Citizens, the Council for 
Exceptional Children, and the Association for Persons with Severe 
                                                        
73 Id. at 63–64. 
74 Id. at 63. 
75 Id. 
76 M.A. WINZER, HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION FROM ISOLATION TO INTEGRATION 
370 (1993). 
77 See id. 
78 YELL, supra note 12, at 64. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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Handicaps all greatly contributed to the national special education 
campaigns, but the major force was the group of parents that engaged in 
incredible advocacy for their children.81 
B. Judicial Response 
The next major stepping-stone in the move for a more complete special 
education system was intimately intertwined with the Civil Rights 
Movement and was also dependent upon the judiciary.82 Following Brown 
v. Board of Education, 83 which established that racially segregated 
educational facilities are inherently unequal, the courts decided two major 
cases in 1972 that greatly extended equal opportunities to special education 
students. In each of these cases, the attorneys used the precedent of Brown 
to argue that the current system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
First, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v. Pennsylvania 
established four critical points: (1) all children with cognitive impairments 
are capable of benefitting from an education program; (2) education 
encompasses more than just academic experiences; (3) students with 
cognitive impairments cannot be denied access to a free education because 
Pennsylvania agreed to provide a free education to all students; and, finally, 
(4) the earlier students with cognitive impairments are identified and served, 
the greater gains they can expect academically and socially.84 This last point 
is probably the most important for the purposes of preschool special 
education because this concept naturally leads to the extension of services at 
the preschool age. Ultimately, the parties resolved the case by a consent 
agreement that required that children with cognitive impairments between 
six and twenty-one years of age must be provided a free education. The 
                                                        
81 Id. at 64–65. 
82 Id. at 66. 
83 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
84 See Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.Supp. 
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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parties also agreed that it was most desirable to educate these children in a 
program like those in which their peers were enrolled, which was a 
precursor description of the LRE.85 However, this case had no impact on the 
preschool-age population. 
Next, in the same year, the Mills v. Board of Education86 court certified a 
class that represented more than eighteen thousand students with various 
disabilities who had been denied access to a free education.87 Under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, the court 
found that because the District of Columbia provided a free education to all 
students, the complete exclusion of students with disabilities was 
unconstitutional, much like the exclusion of students on the basis of race.88 
The decision in this case was extremely important because the court 
outlined satisfactory due process procedures for labeling, placement, and 
exclusion of students with disabilities.89 This later became the framework of 
the first federal legislation addressing special education.90 
These cases provide insight into the basis of the movement because they 
arose out of notions of equal opportunity and protection—ideals nearly 
identical to those of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.91 
These ideals ultimately formed the basis for improving access to education 
for all children. However, because most states do not require preschool 
attendance or even provide free education to all students at the preschool 
level,92 a due process argument would likely not be successful in most states 
                                                        
85 E.L. LEVINE & E.M. WEXLER, P.L. 94-142: AN ACT OF CONGRESS 39 (1981). 
86 Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp 866 (D. DC 1972). 
87 Id. at 868; YELL, supra note 12, at 68. 
88 Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875–76. 
89 Id. at 880–81. 
90 See J.J. Zettel & J. Ballard, The Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
(P.L. 94-142): Its History, Origins, and Concepts, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: 
ITS LEGAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 11–22 (Joseph Ballard et al. eds., 
1982). 
91 YELL, supra note 12, at 67. 
92 See generally W. STEPHEN BARNETT ET AL., STATE OF PRESCHOOLS (National Inst. 
for Early Educ. Research 2009), available at http://nieer.org/yearbook/pdf/yearbook.pdf. 
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or at a national level. Nevertheless, this issue was ultimately circumvented 
by federal special education legislation. 
C. Federal Legislative Response 
Congress had already begun responding to the push for education for all 
children in the late 1950s and early 1960s by passing legislation that 
provided funds and helped to train educators of children with cognitive 
impairments.93 However, it was not until 1965, when Congress passed the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), that the federal 
government began to play a major role in education.94 Up until this point, 
states had generally controlled education, as it is a reserved power under the 
Tenth Amendment. In order to require states to comply with the ESEA, 
Congress used its “power of the purse,” the Taxing and Spending Clause in 
the Constitution, which is the basis for all current legislation related to 
education.95 Essentially, Congress would not appropriate federal education 
funds to states that refused to comply with federal education legislation. 
Ultimately, Congress responded by progressively passing a series of federal 
laws, which at first made preschool special education optional (and were 
more lax on other points as well), but later mandated that states serve this 
population of children. 
Soon after the passage of this initial education legislation, Congress 
amended the ESEA and replaced Title VI of that Act with the Education of 
the Handicapped Act (EHA) of 1970.96 It also passed Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which was the first civil rights law to protect the 
rights of persons with disabilities, and the Education Amendments of 
                                                        
93 YELL, supra note 12, at 69. 
94 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 
27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. ch.70 (2002)). 
95 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
96 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Services that Must be Provided by 
Federally Assisted Schools Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
(20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq.), 161 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000). 
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1974,97 which amended the EHA with the purpose of requiring that all 
states receiving federal funds set a goal of providing educational 
opportunities to all children with disabilities.98 All of this legislative action 
ultimately led to the passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975 (EAHCA)99—“the most significant increase in the role of 
special education to date.”100 
The EAHCA laid out five rights for all students with disabilities that have 
carried through to modern legislation: (1) nondiscriminatory testing, 
evaluation, and placement procedures; (2) education in the least restrictive 
environment; (3) procedural due process; (4) a free education; and (5) an 
appropriate education.101  In drafting this legislation, Congress sought to 
codify the case law that was already controlling—including PARC and 
Mills—and the connection between these five rights and those laid out in 
PARC (referenced above) is very clear.102 It is from this act that FAPE and 
LRE are derived. 103 While the EAHCA seems to require serving 
                                                        
97 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002)); Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 
484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
98 YELL, supra note 12, at 69–70. 
99 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 
89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
100 YELL, supra note 12, at 70. 
101 Id. at 71; see also Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). 
102 KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL 
NEEDS, 174 n.10 (Transaction Publishers 1987) (“The legislative history of the EAHCA 
is replete with references to PARC and Mills.”); see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 
(1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N 1425, 1433 (“[O]ver the past few years, parents 
of handicapped children have begun to recognize that their children are being denied 
services which are guaranteed under the Constitution. It should not be necessary for 
parents throughout the country to continue utilizing the courts to assure themselves a 
remedy.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-322, at 3-4 (1975) (discussing PARC, Mills, and various 
state court decisions). 
103 See FESTUS E. OBIAKOR & SANDRA A. BURKHARDT, CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION 32 (2007) (“The EAHCA mandated the core 
guarantees that undergird today’s IDEA: FAPE for all children with disabilities in the 
least restrictive environment (LRE) determined through non-biased assessment 
procedures and the development of an IEP for each child.”). 
606 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
preschoolers, the Act was deceptive because it actually allowed states to opt 
out of this requirement. For example, they could do so if providing services 
to preschoolers was inconsistent with state law or practice and the state was 
not abandoning services previously provided.104 This was a point of much 
contention during the debate over the EAHCA; as a consequence, the House 
of Representatives proposed a version that mandated services for all 
children aged three to five.105 However, despite the extensive testimony on 
the positive and lasting effects of early intervention, Congress decided that 
the increased costs of providing services to preschoolers outweighed the 
potential gains, so it dropped the preschool mandate.106 Several senators 
dissented, emphasizing that despite the initial cost of providing services, the 
savings realized over the life of a child who benefits from early intervention 
justify mandatory preschool services.107 
Ten years after the EAHCA was enacted, only twenty-one states and the 
District of Columbia provided services to preschoolers with disabilities.108 
Thus, a significant portion of children who needed special education 
services at the preschool level were not receiving them. Congress reacted in 
1986 by amending the EAHCA to provide greater incentives to states that 
                                                        
104 See S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 18–19 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1442–
43 (establishing the reasons for exemptions, but limiting exemptions to only those states 
that did not try to abandon providing services). 
105 Five senators dissented and made the argument that failing to provide a full mandate 
“diluted” the commitment of the Act to those children. They also cited studies showing 
the importance of early intervention. Id. at 81–82, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1479–80. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 81 (“We are cognizant of the concerns of the States regarding their financial 
capacity to provide full education services to this group of children. Nevertheless, we feel 
that it is imperative to point out that the benefits of early identification and education, 
both in terms of prevention of future human tragedy, and in the long-term cost 
effectiveness of tax dollars, are so great as to justify continued emphasis upon preschool 
education for handicapped children.”). 
108 H.R. Rep. No. 99-860, at 42 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401, 2444 
(“Currently all states participate in that state grant program for children 6 to 17, but as of 
July 1985 only 21 states, 4 territories, and the District of Columbia served handicapped 
children from age 3.”). 
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serve preschoolers immediately and to impose penalties on those states that 
failed to do so by 1991.109 
In the same year, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to early 
intervention with the passage of the Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities 
Act.110 This act essentially expanded coverage of the EAHCA to children 
from birth through two years of age.111 However, a key difference between 
the Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities Act and the EAHCA was that 
infants and toddlers were provided services in the home to the maximum 
extent possible, while children under the EAHCA received services in the 
school. 112  This explicit directive on where services were provided for 
infants and toddlers eliminated many of the issues that plagued the system 
for three- to five-year-olds. Similarly, an explicit directive in the IDEA or 
by the states as to where preschoolers are to be educated would eliminate 
many of the uncertainties that surround preschool special education. 
In 1990, the next major change came to federal special education 
legislation: Congress reauthorized and renamed the EAHCA.113 Although 
                                                        
109 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, § 201, 
100 Stat. 1145, 1156 (1986) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (2006)) (“[T]he 
Secretary shall make a grant to any State which . . . has a State plan . . . which includes 
policies and procedures that assure the availability under the State law and practice of 
such State of a free and appropriate public education for all handicapped children aged 
three to five, inclusive.”); 
Pascal L. Trohanis, An Introduction to PL 99-457 and The National Policy Agenda for 
Serving Young Children with Special Needs and Their Families, in POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION & PL 99-457: PLANNING FOR YOUNG CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL 
NEEDS 1, 13 (James J. Gallagher et al. eds., 1989) (“Failure to comply will result in loss 
of the new preschool grant money, as well as funds generated under Part B of the State 
Plan formula for this population group, as well as designated EHA discretionary grants, 
including those for research, training, and demonstration activities.”). 
110 Amendments to the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 100 Stat. 
1145 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1431–44 (2006)). 
111 YELL, supra note 12, at 72. 
112 Id. at 72; 20 U.S.C. § 1436 (“[A] statement of the natural environments in which early 
intervention services will appropriately be provided, including a justification of the 
extent, if any, to which the services will not be provided in a natural environment.”). 
113 YELL, supra note 12, at 73–74. 
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most of the law remained the same, the new moniker, the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), reflected an underlying change in 
society’s view of individuals with disabilities. Most notably, “people first” 
language 114  was used throughout the IDEA—the term “handicap” was 
replaced with the term “disability”—and transition services were added to 
aid the student in smoothly transitioning into the larger community upon 
graduation.115 Finally, in 1997, Congress reauthorized the IDEA and major 
substantive changes were made: first, the 1997 amendments required that all 
students, including preschoolers, make demonstrable academic 
improvements. 116 Second, and possibly more relevant to the current 
discussion, the amendments explicitly included an LRE requirement and 
affirmed its applicability to preschoolers. 117 Previously, the LRE 
requirement was only included in the implementing regulations, which were 
published by the US Department of Education, and did not carry the full 
force of enacted legislation.118 
D. The Current Setting of Federal Special Education Legislation 
In 2004, Congress made its most recent amendments to the IDEA, and 
these amendments reflect yet another changing focus on the integral role of 
                                                        
114 “People first” language means that the person is considered before the disability when 
referring to an individual. For example, instead of saying the “autistic child,” one would 
say the “child with autism.” It is more respectful, and it is meant to emphasize the person 
as individual independent of their disability. 
115 YELL, supra note 12, at 73. 
116 Id. at 74. 
117 Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 Amendments to the 
Federal Regulations, 28 J. L. & EDUC. 543, 552 (1999) (“There is no definition given in 
this section for the term LRE, but a cross-reference is made to Sec. 1412(a)(5)(A) where 
the term now appears, for the first time, within the text of the law. . . . The words ‘least 
restrictive environment’ have officially been transferred from the federal regulations into 
the statute.”); id. at 555–56 (“References to the LRE provisions can be found explicitly in 
several sections of the reauthorized federal code. . . . A reference that these LRE 
provisions apply to preschool children with disabilities now appears in [then] Sec. 
300.552.”). 
118 Id. at 552. 
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the family in education. Congress again emphasized the importance of 
tailoring educational programs to prepare students with disabilities to live 
their lives integrated into the community.119 Such a goal entails education 
not just in the traditional sense, but also in the practical and functional 
sense. In its findings, Congress recognized that this necessarily includes 
meaningful participation on the part of families.120 
The concept of family involvement is also evident in the IDEA itself, and 
it seems to be more valued at younger ages. Currently, under the IDEA, 
children ages three through twenty-one are served under Part B, while 
children from birth through age two are served under Part C.121 Each part 
emphasizes the importance of family involvement, but that emphasis is 
more clearly ascertainable under Part C, which mandates the creation of an 
individualized family service plan (IFSP).122 An IFSP includes statements 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the family that relate to the 
development of the child, as well as statements of expected outcomes for 
both the child and the family as a whole.123 Moreover, as mentioned above, 
the preferred setting for delivery of services is the home.124 
However, for preschool students under Part B, much of the emphasis on 
family is removed, and the focus is on the individual child through the 
creation of an IEP.125 An IEP is required for each student identified as 
having a disability.126 Creation of an IEP falls to a team that includes the 
                                                        
119 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006) (“Improving educational results of children with 
disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for 
individuals with disabilities.”). 
120 Id. § 1400(c)(5)(B). 
121 The chapter is divided into subchapters II and III. Subchapter II covers children ages 
three to twenty-one, and subchapter III covers children ages birth through two. Note that 
subchapters II and III are commonly referred to as Parts B and C. See 20 U.S.C. ch. 33. 
122 Id. § 1436. 
123 Id. § 1436(d). 
124 See id. § 1472. 
125 See id. §§ 1411–1419, 1431–1444. 
126 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
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parent, the regular education teacher, the special education teacher, a 
representative of the LEA, other qualified individuals that may have 
specialized knowledge about the child, and, when appropriate, the child.127 
The teacher who writes the IEP generally conducts the meetings. The 
teacher begins by reviewing the child’s “present levels of academic 
achievement and functional performance, including . . . for preschool 
children, as appropriate, how the disability affects the child’s participation 
in appropriate activities.”128 Then, the team discusses the child’s annual 
measurable goals and the methods that will be used for their 
measurement.129 Finally, and most importantly for the child, as required by 
the IDEA, the team reviews the special education and related services that 
will be provided to aid the child in (1) “advanc[ing] appropriately toward 
attaining the annual goals,” (2) being “involved in and mak[ing] progress in 
the general education curriculum,” (3) “participat[ing] in extracurricular and 
other nonacademic activities,” and (4) being “educated and participat[ing] 
with other children with disabilities and nondisabled children in the 
activities described” in the IEP.130  The IEP team also contemplates the 
extent to which the child will be educated in an environment that does not 
include his nondisabled peers—essentially, the team should note why the 
child is not being educated in the LRE at all times.131 
Although the parents and the child are included in the annual IEP 
meeting, the presumptive LRE becomes a general education classroom with 
nondisabled peers, and FAPE is presumptively provided at state-run public 
schools.132  If parents believe that the IEP and the school are failing to 
provide FAPE in the LRE, they retain the right to challenge the adequacy of 
the IEP and its implementation through mediation or a due process 
                                                        
127 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B). 
128 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb). 
129 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II) –(III). 
130 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV). 
131 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(V). 
132 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.114 (2006). 
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hearing.133 If these remedies prove unsatisfactory, parents have a right of 
civil action in state or federal court on behalf of their child, as well as an 
independent action.134 Moreover, parents may seek alternative placements 
for their child in private settings, and the school district may be required to 
cover those expenses.135 Private placements like this have been the result of 
much litigation and are beyond the scope of this piece;136 however, there is 
a certain level of interaction between private placement and preschool that 
will be discussed briefly below. Thus, although the focus swings slightly 
away from the family and towards the child as an individual, the parents 
retain significant influence and control over their child’s education. 
If you remember, Quinn is three-and-half-years-old, so he falls under Part 
B of the IDEA. Therefore, the IEP team worked together to create an IEP 
for Quinn—not an individualized family service plan—and Quinn’s parents 
have the right to challenge the adequacy of that IEP.137 However, because 
Quinn falls under Part B, it is also true that Quinn is to be served in the LRE 
and provided FAPE—which would presumably be in a regular education 
classroom with his nondisabled peers at a state-run public school. Although 
the guarantees of FAPE and the LRE are meant to protect children and 
provide them with the most meaningful and beneficial education, Quinn’s 
parents fear that these guarantees will do the opposite. They fear that Quinn 
will not benefit, grow, or learn appropriately in the district preschool 
because the family was uncomfortable with the district preschool setting 
and Quinn is already making strides socially, academically, and emotionally 
in his current preschool. But should Quinn’s parents be given deference in 
                                                        
133 34 C.F.R. § 300.506–597 (2011); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(5)–(7) (2006). 
134 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2); see also Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 500 U.S. 516 
(2007). 
135 See 20 U.S.C. §1415(k). 
136 Several cases have arisen regarding private placement. Most recently, in Forest Grove 
School District v. T. A., the Supreme Court held that parents are entitled to 
reimbursement for private school placement when the IEP fails to meet FAPE 
requirements. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T. A, 129 S.Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009). 
137 Crockett, supra note 117. 
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making this determination? Or, was it Congress’s will that states are 
supposed to make the decision, independent of the preferences of parents? 
This brings us back to the ever-present tension discussed in Part I, but it 
also illustrates some of the specific conflicts that can arise in the context of 
preschool special education. 
IV. HOW THE UNIQUE SYSTEM OF PRESCHOOL COMPLICATES    
DELIVERY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 
Special education for preschoolers is delivered in accordance with Part B 
of the IDEA.138 This means that preschoolers are entitled to a free and 
appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment 
(LRE). However, for numerous reasons, delivering these services to 
preschoolers is not as straightforward as delivering them to their school-age 
counterparts. First, as previously noted, there are no compulsory education 
laws for preschoolers in the United States, so requiring students to attend 
preschool to receive special education services necessarily encroaches upon 
a decision-making process that is currently reserved for parents. Second, 
there is great difficulty in determining the LRE for preschoolers because of 
the lack of a presumptive general education environment and curriculum.139 
Finally, related to both the first and second points, because there are no 
compulsory attendance laws for preschool, an expansive system of state-run 
preschools has not yet developed. As a result, preschool students are not 
only compelled to attend public schools, but they are also often compelled 
to attend certain private schools. 
A. The Importance of Early Childhood Education 
First and foremost, the preschool system is unique because of the 
incredible importance of early childhood education, especially for children 
who have special education needs. Recently, several states and the federal 
                                                        
138 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i). 
139 See Demonte, supra note 9, at 158. 
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government have recognized the critical importance of early learning and 
have implemented state and federal programs that seek to address the 
problems present in the current system, including a push for universal, or 
compulsory, preschool programs.140 It is becoming clearer to educators and 
scientists that these formative preschool years can have an enormous impact 
on the future successes of all children both academically and 
economically. 141  This general notion seems to be even more true for 
preschoolers with special needs, whose ability to work and function within 
society may depend upon early intervention and services. 
Countless studies outline the benefits of early intervention and early 
childhood education.142 These studies tend to show that the earlier children 
are identified and provided services, the more likely they are to make 
greater gains educationally, socially, and emotionally.143 The outcomes of 
early intervention are not only significant for individuals and families; early 
intervention can also save the state thousands of dollars over the lifetime of 
the child because a child who makes greater gains earlier will need fewer 
services and supports later. 
To illustrate the impact of early identification and intervention, it is 
helpful to examine data recently released on the potential impacts that early 
                                                        
140 See State Profiles, PRE-K NOW, http://www.preknow.org/resource/profiles/ (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2011); Rachel Ryan, Obama’s Universal Preschool Book, FRUM FORUM 
(July 27, 2010), http://www.frumforum.com/obamas-universal-preschool-push. 
141 See Deborah Lowe Vandall, et al., Do Effects of Early Child Care Extend to Age 15 
Years? Results From the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, in 
81 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 737-756 at 2 (May 13, 2010), available at 
http://nieer.org/pdf/Effects_of_Early_Child_Care_Extend_to_Age_15.pdf 
(“[A]ssociation between quality and achievement was mediated, in part, by earlier child 
care effects on achievement”); Julia B. Isaacs, Impacts of Early Childhood Programs, 
Brookings Institute (Sept. 2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/09_early_programs_isaacs.aspx; David 
Leonhardt, The Case for $320,000 Kindergarten Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/business/economy/28leonhardt.html. 
142 See LYNN A. KAROLY ET AL., EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS: PROVEN 
RESULTS, FUTURE PROMISE 6–14 (2005). 
143 See id.  
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intervention can have for children who have been diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorder (ASD).144 The prevalence of ASD diagnoses has rapidly 
risen in recent years, which has garnered much attention from the education 
and medical communities.145 At this point, “experts working with children 
with autism agree that early intervention is critical,” and “the earlier that 
intervention begins in children’s lives, the better the outcomes.”146 Because 
this intervention is so crucial, many studies have tried to discern exactly 
when and how the intervention should be conducted. Some metastudies 
compare the results of several others: 
These studies generally compare children who are older than four 
or five years with those who are younger than four or five years. 
One study comparing children younger than three years with those 
older than three years did not find age differences in improvement, 
which may suggest that four years of age is young enough to lead 
to significant gains.147 
                                                        
144 ASD encompasses a broad number of conditions characterized by widespread 
abnormalities of social interaction and communication, repetitive behaviors, and 
restricted interests. At one end of the spectrum are conditions that have a minimal impact 
on daily life, and at the other end are those that totally incapacitate the individual. (This 
was a definition the author developed with her aunt and that she used in parent handouts. 
Her aunt is the owner, director, and a lead teacher at a preschool that serves children ages 
two-and-a-half to five in Colorado. She has her masters in early childhood education, 
over thirty years of experience in the classroom and with children and families affected 
by ASD.) 
145 Alice Park, Autism: The Numbers Are Rising The Question is Why?, TIME (Dec. 19, 
2009), available at http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1948842,00.html; 
Brian A. Boyd et al., Infants and Toddlers with Autism Spectrum Disorder: Early 
Identification and Early Intervention, 32 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 75, 76 n.2  (March 
2010) (“The prevalence of ASD has increased tremendously over the last two decades” 
from 1–2/10,000 between the 1960s and 1980, to 35–60/10,000 in 2005.). 
146 Christine M. Corsello, Early Intervention in Autism, in 18 INFANTS & YOUNG 
CHILDREN 74 (2005), available at http://depts.washington.edu/isei/iyc/corsello_18_2.pdf; 
Boyd at al., supra note 145, at 75. 
147 Boyd et al., supra note 145, at 75–77. 
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This comparison perfectly illustrates the extreme importance of the 
preschool years—if children are identified and provided services by four 
years of age, they are more likely to see significant gains. 
As a result, there is currently a push in a number of states to implement a 
universal preschool program to which all children will have access. In 2006, 
the Illinois Congress passed the first law that establishes the goal of offering 
preschool to all of its residents, but it did not go so far as to make preschool 
compulsory for any of its citizens.148 Other states, such as Oklahoma, New 
Jersey, and Georgia, have also been moving towards implementing a 
universal preschool program. 149  Additionally, Congress has consistently 
recognized the importance of early childhood education and intervention, 
especially in terms of special education. 
Moreover, because of the wide range of preschool education settings 
available to parents and children, the current system makes it nearly 
impossible for states to adequately identify and serve preschoolers.150 There 
is also evidence that without state or educational involvement in the form of 
public or private preschool professionals, parents are less likely to identify 
the special education needs of their child; thus, the child is more likely to 
remain unidentified and without access to special education services.151 
Because of the significant economic impacts of early identification and 
intervention, combined with the difficulty in accessing students in the 
current preschool systems, states have a substantial incentive to establish a 
                                                        
148 Matt Singer, Illinois Joins Preschool For All Movement, Progressive States Network, 
PROGESSIVESTATES.ORG (July 31, 2006, 9:40am), 
http://www.progressivestates.org/news/dispatch/illinois-joins-pre-school-all-movement. 
149 Id.; PRE-K NOW.ORG, supra note 140. 
150 See EARLY LEARNING FOR ALL, Types of Early Care and Education Programs, 
http://www.earlylearningforall.org/programs.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter 
EARLY LEARNING]; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414. 
151 See D.L. v. District of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 84, 99 (2010) (finding that without 
adequate education, outreach, and action on the part of the school district, only 3 percent 
of preschool-aged children were identified as needing services, but the average rate of 
preschool aged children that qualify is 6 percent). 
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preschool system that facilitates easier referral and identification methods 
so that state dollars can be spent most effectively and efficiently. 
The impact of early childhood education and intervention is clearly 
substantial—and as such, it is further evidence of the unique and crucial 
position that preschool special education has in the United States. 
Depending on Quinn’s diagnosis, the identification of his disability and the 
provision of services could have a dramatic impact on his development and, 
subsequently, the costs incurred by the school. Quinn’s parents still have an 
interest—and they will probably want to do what is best for him—but 
because of the potential gains to be made and the costs to be saved, the state 
has a very strong interest as well. It is in the best interest of Quinn, 
according to the recent data, to receive services as early as possible. 
However, that does not mean Quinn’s parents should be stripped of their 
interest in directing his education. Regardless of whether the state or the 
parents make the determination, there must be a quick resolution because 
Quinn is not alone. There are thousands of children, families, and schools 
throughout the United States that need a resolution to this complex issue. 
B. Decisions Regarding Preschool Attendance Are Generally Left to 
Parents 
All fifty states have a compulsory school attendance law, but none of 
those laws affect children below the age of five.152 In addition, as described 
above, in order to receive federal funds through the IDEA, states must agree 
to serve all children with special education needs from birth through age 
twenty-one.153 This means that all determinations of how, when, where, and 
if a child attends preschool are generally left to parents, unless that child is 
identified as being in need of special education services. The discretion 
retained by parents has led to the development of several different types of 
formal preschool programs, religious-based programs, home-based 
                                                        
152 See Bush, supra note 5. 
153 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411–19, 1431–1444. 
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programs, play-based programs, and daycare programs.154 Within each of 
these categories there are also many variations. 
It is clear that Congress intended for children to be educated in the most 
inclusive setting available (and possible), as indicated by the LRE 
requirement, but because of the huge variations in preschool programs, it is 
difficult to determine which setting, formal or informal, is preferred by the 
IDEA. 155  This is because the general goal of preschool is to provide 
children with kindergarten-readiness skills, which include “social, 
cognitive, and language foundations that they leverage for rapid 
learning.”156 These skills can potentially be obtained in any of the settings 
mentioned above.157 States face another difficulty as a result of the current 
preschool system because they must ensure that children in need of special 
education and related services, or children who are suspected of being in 
need of special education or related services, are identified, located, and 
evaluated.158 Due to the many variations that exist in the preschool system, 
it is nearly impossible for the state to adequately complete this task because 
there is no way for the state to have a hand in all programs. A recent class 
action ruling in a case in the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia addressed  the state’s failure to identify and serve preschoolers. 
The court found that less than 3 percent of children in the District of 
Columbia were being served, but the average rate of children in need of 
services was closer to 6 percent.159 The situation in the District of Columbia 
illustrates the problems faced by many school districts as a result of the 
wide variety of settings. 
Consider these issues in light of Quinn, his parents, and the legal and 
philosophical arguments concerning the rights of parents and the state. 
                                                        
154 EARLY LEARNING, supra note 150. 
155 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414. 
156 Demonte, supra note 9, at 185. 
157 Id. at 186. 
158 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2006). 
159 D.L. v. District of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 84, 99 (2010). 
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Quinn’s parents were not subject to any state interference in their decisions 
regarding Quinn’s education prior to his identification. They had complete 
and total freedom in determining how, when, where, and if Quinn was 
educated. But once he was identified and determined to be eligible, the 
school asserted an interest in Quinn’s education. Due to this interest, the 
school required Quinn to attend the district preschool because it contended 
that this was Quinn’s LRE. But there are many, many difficulties and 
uncertainties surrounding such a determination. 
C. There Is No Presumptive Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) 
 Another major, and probably more difficult, issue facing schools and 
parents is the attempt to determine the LRE. For school-age children, the 
presumptive LRE is the general education classroom in public schools; and, 
for infants and toddlers (children from birth through age two) the cognate of 
the LRE is the home, to the maximum extent possible.160 These standards 
are clearly established in legislation and through jurisprudence, although 
some litigation still arises, especially in regards to private placements.161 
But for preschoolers, there is no presumptive LRE, probably in part because 
of the diversity of programs discussed above.162 
The IDEA requires that children are educated in the LRE to the 
maximum extent possible and that they are removed “only when the nature 
or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular 
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved 
                                                        
160 Sch. Comm. v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (“The [IDEA] contemplates 
that such education will be provided where possible in regular public schools . . . but the 
Act also provides for placement in private schools at public expense where that is not 
possible.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1432(4)(G) (2005) (stating that early intervention services, “to 
the maximum extent appropriate, are provided in  natural environments, including the 
home, and community settings in which children without disabilities participate”). 
161 See Ralph D. Mawsley, The Supreme Court’s Reassessment of Parental Unilateral 
Placement Under the Idea: Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 251 EDUC. LAW REP. 1 
(2010) (discussing past litigation and the most recent US Supreme Court determination). 
162 Demonte, supra note 9. 
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satisfactorily.”163 To fully comprehend the issues that arise in this stage of 
the evaluation process, it is important to better understand the Individual 
Education Program (IEP). Included in the IEP are statements of annual 
goals that are meant to help students bridge the educational gap created by 
their disabilities.164 The IEP team is then required to describe this gap in 
terms of how the disability “affects the child’s involvement and progress in 
the general education curriculum” or the curriculum used for general 
education children.165 
Because there is no general curriculum for preschoolers, the IEP instead 
describes how the disability affects the child’s participation in “appropriate 
activities.”166 The US Department of Education recognized that this term 
may have many meanings, and in response it released a statement 
explaining that appropriate activities include “age-relevant developmental 
abilities or milestones that typically developing children of the same age 
would be performing or would have achieved.”167 This definition is unclear. 
Therefore, there is uncertainty from the start in determining what exactly 
preschool children should be achieving. 
The problem of unclear achievement goals is only exacerbated when the 
IEP team must determine the LRE because there is no presumptive LRE. 
This dilemma could be attributed to the lack of school-run preschool 
programs resulting from the absence of compulsory education laws for the 
preschool age group. Or, more problematic, it could be because there is a 
lack of certainty within the education and parenting communities about the 
necessity of a formal school environment for preschoolers. The uncertainty 
regarding the necessity of a formal school environment is probably due to 
                                                        
163 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5)(A). 
164 See id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)–(III). 
165 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). 
166 Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(bb). 
167 Assistance to the States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and the Early 
Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers With Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg. 12405, 
12471 (Mar. 12, 1999) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
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the fact that many children do not attend preschool at all. Instead, many 
children participate in community-based home or daycare programs until 
they are four or five years old and ready to enter the public school 
system. 168  School districts have attempted to resolve this situation in 
different ways. Some have chosen to create altogether new programs that 
attempt to integrate special education and general education students.169 
Others choose to pay for the children to attend privately run preschools or 
daycares.170 However, it is not clear that schools alone should be making 
this determination at all when so much uncertainty about placement still 
exists. 
Many parents have been unsatisfied with the determinations made for 
their children and have challenged the determinations through the appeals 
process. The case law that has resulted is both divided and weak. According 
to one researcher, the cases can be “roughly divided into two categories: 
those upholding segregated special education placements as the LRE and 
those upholding inclusive preschools designed for nondisabled children as 
the LRE.”171 The cases upholding inclusive preschools will be addressed 
first. 
In Board of Education of LaGrange School District v. Illinois State 
Board of Education, the court held that special education classes, even 
when housed in regular schools, are more restrictive than necessary in terms 
of providing FAPE in the LRE when the child can benefit from a regular 
                                                        
168 See W. Steven Barnett & Donald J. Yarosz, Preschool Policy Brief: Who Goes to 
Preschool and Why Does it Matter?, 15 NAT’L INST. OF EARLY EDUC. RES.: POL’Y 
BRIEF SERIES 1, 5 (2007), available at http://nieer.org/resources/policybriefs/15.pdf. 
169 See, e.g., Samuel L. Odom & Don Bailey, Inclusive Preschool Programs: Classroom 
Ecology and Child Outcomes, in EARLY CHILDHOOD INCLUSION: FOCUS ON CHANGE 
253, 260–61 (Michael J. Guralnick ed., 2001). 
170 See, e.g., Editorial, Improving Preschool Special Education, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/07/opinion/improving-preschool-special-
education.html. 
171 Demonte, supra note 9, at 178. 
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setting.172 Because the child was not being educated in the LRE, the court 
required that the school district pay for the child’s tuition to attend a private 
preschool.173 Shortly thereafter, T.R. ex rel. N.R. v. Kingwood Township 
Board of Education was decided.174 Based on similar reasoning, the court 
found that a mixed special education preschool, in which half of the 
children were disabled, did not constitute the LRE because there was no 
evidence that the child’s IEP could not have been implemented in a regular 
classroom.175 Thus, the school had to consider the option of placement in a 
regular preschool program.176 Finally, in L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School 
District, the court determined that a mixed special education preschool 
containing between 30 and 50 percent nondisabled children did not 
constitute the LRE for a child with autism spectrum disorder. 177  This 
decision seems the most expansive because the child required the assistance 
of a full-time aide in the regular preschool setting and an additional twenty-
five to thirty hours per week of therapy; the school was required to pay for 
all of these services.178 The courts decided each of these cases in a way that 
preferred an inclusive, integrated setting, with this last decision being the 
most far reaching. Thus, it seems that this precedent supports the idea of 
giving parents greater control in placement at this age. 
However, at the opposite end of the spectrum in 2008, the court in M.W. 
v. Clark County School District upheld the school’s decision to place a 
three-year-old boy in a self-contained, district-run, autism preschool 
classroom. 179  The boy’s parents were dissatisfied with the decision and 
                                                        
172 Bd. of Educ. of LaGrange Sch. Dist. No.105 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ, 184 F.3d 
912, 918 (7th Cir. 1999). 
173 Id. at 918. 
174 T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2000). 
175 Id. at 576, 579–80. 
176 Id. 
177 L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 978 (10th Cir. 2004). 
178 Id. at 968, 978. 
179 M.W. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:06-CV-49, 2008 WL 4449591 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 
29, 2008). 
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unilaterally moved him to a private placement to prevent him from 
regressing.180 Subsequently, they sought reimbursement for the costs of the 
private program.181 The court dismissed the parents’ complaint and held that 
the district’s decision adequately provided educational benefits and FAPE. 
Consequently, it was unclear whether the IEP team should have to consider 
private placement at all.182 “The decision implies that so long as a child 
receives an education calculated to confer benefits, the LRE requirement 
does not have independent significance, at least at the preschool level where 
the only regular programs available may be private.”183 The reasoning for 
M.W. is very similar to another decision from twenty years prior, but until 
this decision, that reasoning had not been widely accepted or applied.184 
Thus, the case law is becoming equally as convoluted as it is inconsistent, 
and precedent seems to have little influence over subsequent decisions. 
The case law is both confusing and enlightening because, while it 
reaffirms that there is not a presumptive LRE for preschoolers, there is also 
no clear pattern of holdings. Therefore, neither parents nor schools can be 
sure that a court will uphold their decision as to the best placement for the 
child. Moreover, challenges to school district determinations are both costly 
and time consuming for parents and school districts. Although there is a 
right to a due process hearing, the laws are difficult to navigate without 
legal assistance, so it can be an incredibly daunting task for a parent to 
challenge an entire school system. Thus, while there seems to be relief for 
some parents by way of litigation, this option may not be not available to 
everyone. 
                                                        
180 Id. at *6–7. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at *9 n. 16. 
183 Demonte, supra note 9, at 178. 
184 Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the school district need only provide an appropriate placement for the child, and that 
the LRE requirement cannot dictate a contrary result). 
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As evidenced by the case law, parents such as Quinn’s retain an interest 
in determining what the LRE for their child should be. By ultimately 
upholding the parents’ determination of the LRE, these cases seem to imply 
that parents are in a better position (having spent three or more years one-
on-one with their child) to know the individual needs of the child socially, 
cognitively, and linguistically. Yet, schools make the ultimate 
determinations regarding placement after they conduct only a standard 
evaluation of the child  and hold an IEP team meeting. After this process, if 
the parents disagree with the school’s determination, they must contest 
those determinations through costly due process hearings. In the IDEA, 
Congress was vague and ambiguous in its charge to states and schools. 
Despite its noble intentions, the judiciary has not been able to resolve these 
inconsistencies. This predicament has led to greater confusion about the 
determination of the LRE and the education of preschoolers with special 
needs, as well as to a possible encroachment upon the rights of parents, like 
Quinn’s, in directing the education of their preschoolers. 
D. There Is Not an Extensive System of State-Run Preschools, So Private 
Placement Becomes Inevitable 
Finally, the lack of compulsory education and public programs at the 
preschool level leads to a situation where some states are paying for private 
preschool education in order to guarantee FAPE to eligible children. Private 
placement is allowed under the IDEA, but it is an issue that has been 
litigated extensively because of the potential costs for the schools.185 Again, 
the main issue in the preschool setting is about who makes the placement 
determination, especially when there is a difference of opinion. The school 
may determine that it will only pay for education in certain settings, such as 
formal settings, but the parents may determine that it is in the best interest 
                                                        
185 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10) (2006); see generally Joseph O. Oluwole, Forest Grove 
School District v. T.A.: The Supreme Court, Tuition Reimbursement and Prior Receipt of 
Special Education Services Under the IDEA, 266 ED. LAW. REP. 505 (2010). 
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of the child to remain in a home-based program. Because there is not a 
presumptive LRE or curriculum for preschoolers, there is no clear picture as 
to which determination should control. 
Moreover, the cost of education may become a major point of contention 
between parents and schools. Many people believe that quality increases as 
cost increases, and parents are likely to seek the highest quality education 
for their child. But school districts are footing the bill, so there will 
inevitably be major disagreements regarding placement on the basis of cost. 
Finally, due to the lack of public preschool programs and the prevalence of 
religious-based preschool programs, there may be potential First 
Amendment issues regarding the separation of church and state. 
This issue of private placement is inextricably linked to the tension 
between state and parental control of education because it is an attempt by 
the state to control the choices of parents in an area that is traditionally 
reserved for total parental control. The entire argument regarding parental 
placement is much more involved than this brief discussion, but those issues 
are beyond the scope of this article.186 
V. HOW CAN, AND SHOULD, THESE CONFLICTS BE RESOLVED IN 
LIGHT OF THESE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL CONCERNS? 
As Gutmann’s theory of the “democratic state of individuals” posits, the 
responsibility to direct preschool special education must be shared between 
parents and the state. Both of these parties have a significant interest in the 
education of the child, yet neither can fully account for all of the interests of 
the child. These competing interests make it difficult to determine which 
concern should triumph over the other because there is no clearly dominant 
interest. Therefore, the resolution must accommodate the interests of 
                                                        
186 This article deals primarily with preschool-aged children and the tension that exists 
between the parents and the states in determining placement generally for those children. 
The arguments surrounding private placement usually involve arguments concerning 
costs and the rights of parents to unilaterally choose a private placement for their child. 
The Uncertainties of Educating a Preschooler with Special Needs 625 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011 
parents as well as the interests of the states. It must also comport with the 
constitutional rights of parents by not encroaching upon their guaranteed 
rights to care, custody, and control of their children. These complex issues, 
which have arisen within the system of special education as it relates to 
preschool, could be resolved with relatively simple amendments to the 
IDEA or to the implementing regulations of the IDEA. Undoubtedly, there 
will be much consideration and deliberation on any change that is made, but 
the substantive changes would not involve the same complexity that is 
involved with many of the more contentious provisions, typically relating to 
implementation of costs. 
There are two broad routes that Congress could take to clarify the 
ambiguities and resolve the discrepancies. First, there could be an 
amendment to the IDEA that defines an appropriate preschool setting or the 
presumptive LRE for preschoolers. Second, more discretion could be left to 
the states, and the IDEA’s regulatory provisions could be amended to 
include a requirement that all states clearly outline which settings constitute 
the LRE. 
A. An Amendment to the IDEA 
Congress could resolve many of the uncertainties by amending the IDEA 
to include a definition of appropriate preschools in which services could be 
delivered. The amendment could not, however, eliminate parents’ decision-
making power, and parents would continue to retain their constitutional 
rights. For example, as established in Pierce, creating a state monopoly over 
preschool education would be unconstitutional because, in conjunction with 
the requirement to attend a preschool imposed upon special education 
students, it would remove all control from the parents. 187  Therefore, it 
would be best for Congress to amend the LRE and provide a comprehensive 
list of minimum standards that preschool settings must have in order to 
                                                        
187 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
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satisfy the FAPE requirement. These standards should also contemplate the 
presence of appropriate activities in each preschool setting because this is 
what FAPE is meant to provide. In drafting these standards, it might be 
most efficient to require that satisfactory preschool settings must be 
accredited or licensed by the state. A provision like this would allow some 
flexibility within each state in establishing standards to be met in an 
otherwise rigid federal statute. 
Most importantly, Congress must ensure that the provisions are not so 
narrow that all control over educational choices is effectively removed from 
parents. Therefore, Congress must not include provisions to eliminate a 
certain type of preschool setting that would otherwise provide appropriate 
activities, such as a play-based program, because the elimination of 
otherwise acceptable programs would impede on parental rights. Any 
provision that requires a particular curriculum or set of educational goals 
and standards would likely eliminate entirely play-based settings. 
Therefore, despite the current push for achievement, educational 
benchmarks should be avoided at the preschool level because the inclusion 
of such standards would eliminate an entire class of settings from those 
currently available to all parents. 
Instead, the list of minimum standards should be broad enough to include 
all settings that adequately provide the child with the opportunity to 
participate in appropriate activities, even those that are not following a set 
curriculum. First, there should be a requirement that the preschool is state-
licensed or accredited. This requirement will be discussed in greater length 
below. Following that, the list should include requirements regarding 
minimum teacher- and director-education requirements; student to teacher 
ratios; general education student population to special education student 
population ratios; the availability of facilities like playgrounds, open space, 
kitchens, age-appropriate bathrooms, and therapy spaces for use by service 
providers; and, the total number of students per classroom. In order to 
determine appropriate standards, Congress should look to current state 
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licensing and accreditation standards for guidance and should consult with 
early childhood education research authorities, like the National Institute for 
Early Education Research. Requirements beyond these minimum standards 
may be advisable, but Congress must be careful not to get too specific and 
impose on the parental rights. 
One way to ensure that parents retain some control would be for 
Congress to require that the IEP team meeting include a discussion 
regarding the specific placement of a preschooler. Such a requirement 
would most likely be an amendment to the IDEA section on IEP meetings. 
Then, Congress could elaborate upon the requirements of the discussion and 
placement offerings by asking the Department of Education to amend the 
Code of Federal Regulations. A review of every possible preschool setting, 
along with the pros and cons of each, should be included in that discussion. 
Under the current legislation, these pros and cons must be related to the 
implementation of the child’s IEP, and there must be consideration of which 
possibilities can constitute the LRE for the child. 
A single list of possible preschool settings would be hard to create 
because, undoubtedly, it will be nearly impossible to account for every type 
of setting. In light of the importance of early childhood education, it is 
essential that the described settings include quality programs. Flowing from 
this, it seems almost certain that the list should be limited to state-accredited 
or licensed facilities, which should also be a standard included in the 
amendment to the IDEA as discussed above. This is desirable because it 
leaves the state some discretion regarding preschool education. Moreover, 
this allows the state to more carefully craft the requirements of licensing 
and accreditation so that the number of schools that qualify is limited. This 
may even result in states creating separate requirements for preschools and 
childcare centers, which could potentially be very beneficial for early 
childhood education. 
On the basis of this first accreditation requirement, there should be a 
district-run preschool option if available. Following that, there should be 
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options for nonprofit preschool settings, parochial preschool settings, and 
privately run preschool settings, because this type of diversity in settings 
would preserve parental rights by allowing choice among competing 
alternatives. Although this seems expansive, there could be a “feasibility 
clause” put into place. This would allow the school and the parents to take 
into account the feasibility of sending the child to each setting. Feasibility 
should be defined to include the costs, the distance to and from the child’s 
home, the practical ability for providers to serve the child in the setting, and 
any other logistical considerations. For example, if a child qualifies for 
several hours of services per week, and the service providers must travel to 
and from the child’s school to make those services available, then the 
school may be justified in requiring that the parent choose a preschool 
within a certain geographical distance, so long as there are sufficient 
options within that distance. Such a clause would immediately narrow the 
scope of the list. Additionally, as discussed above, states may intentionally 
choose to narrow the scope by requiring stricter standards for licensing or 
accreditation. It is important to remember that throughout all of these 
discussions, the requirement of LRE still applies and will also narrow the 
scope of possible placements. Finally, it is crucial to include reference to 
“appropriate activities,” so that the amendment is consistent with current 
IDEA requirements. 
There are some negative consequences of adopting an amendment like 
the one proposed. For example, a set of standards may initially lead to 
litigation because there are bound to be uncertainties that must be resolved, 
like what is “feasible.” However, this may prove to be positive in the long 
run as there should be a decrease in litigation surrounding preschool 
placements because there would be a controlling statute that parents and 
schools could look to for the determination. Additionally, there may be 
initial backlash from both parents and school administration because each 
will feel that they are in the best position to be making placement 
determinations. 
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Despite these drawbacks, an amendment to the IDEA, including the 
provisions proposed above, would still be a desirable solution to the issue of 
preschool special education placement because it would eliminate any 
variance in application among states and provide parents and states with 
definite, fixed standards that must be adhered to. However, an amendment, 
like the one proposed, would not completely eliminate the tension discussed 
and analyzed throughout this article because parents and schools will 
inevitably continue to compete over the right to control education. Instead, 
an amendment would provide a concrete and legal set of standards that 
takes into account the competing interests of both parties, eliminating the 
need for additional costly litigation in this area of law and allowing each 
party to retain some control. 
B. Require Clear State Standards to Be Set 
Another method of solving the current problem is to require each state to 
set clear standards regarding what constitutes a preschool for purposes of 
the IDEA. Under this solution, Congress would also allow the states to 
retain broader discretion than they currently possess by requiring them to 
adopt their own standards. Such a solution would again necessitate an 
amendment to either the IDEA itself or a change in its implementing 
regulations. This amendment would not be substantive, however. Instead, it 
would simply be a requirement that states adopt clear standards regarding 
which settings they determine will expose preschool children to appropriate 
activities, thus satisfying the FAPE requirement. 
The actual requirements adopted by each state would likely vary 
dramatically and reflect the unique characteristics of individual states. For 
example, a more rural or mountainous state may want to require that 
children attend a state-run preschool because of the difficulty in physically 
getting to all of the different possible settings to serve children. But, in 
states where the population is more concentrated in urban settings, it may be 
less costly to send providers to existing preschools instead of actually 
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operating a completely new school. Or, states may want to allow localities 
to make these determinations depending on their individual needs. 
Regardless of what the states ultimately choose, the amendment should 
make clear that states must come up with a set of applied standards that 
comport with IDEA requirements, specifically the requirement that 
preschoolers are learning appropriate activities. This is imperative because, 
without a concrete set of standards, many potential ambiguities would still 
exist. Included in the standards should be a definition of settings that satisfy 
the preschool requirement. Similar to how an amendment to the IDEA 
would have to contemplate appropriate activities, so too must state 
standards. 
The likely result of this approach is a broad range of definitions of 
preschool that are unique to each state, but that also maintain parental 
rights. Some states may institute a definition that greatly limits parental 
choice, while others may institute definitions that allow for a lot of 
discretion on the part of parents. Still, others may try to create a definition 
that more equally balances the interests of each. No matter where the 
standards fall on this spectrum, the states must ensure that the standards still 
comport with the constitutional rights of parents.188 Therefore, states will 
not be able to completely remove control from parents, and they must be 
careful in drafting the standards so as to not violate parental constitutional 
rights. 
This solution of individualized and consistent state standards is desirable 
because it will allow states to adopt solutions that they feel are most 
appropriate for their citizens. This evokes a classic federalism argument: 
those closest to the problems should retain the power to address the 
problems. It also allows those states that have already begun the process of 
revamping or centralizing preschool education to create standards that will 
work in conjunction with other state programs. Furthermore, states would 
                                                        
188 Id. at 534. 
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be able to experiment with different standards, definitions, and statutory 
schemes, which would allow each state to learn from the trials and errors of 
the other states. Ultimately, the most successful schemes will likely be 
adopted by many states. This is also a classic federalism argument—states 
can act as “laboratories of democracy”189 by deciding for themselves what 
is most appropriate for their citizens, which allows citizens to choose states 
that pass laws consistent with their own desires. 
However, this solution also has drawbacks because there may be 
confusion among states and parents. Additionally, the IDEA, a federal law, 
would not be applied equally to all children and families. A solution that 
provides more power to the states may also result in protracted challenges 
to the constitutional legitimacy of the different standards because a 
constitutional right is involved. Ultimately, it seems that the benefits of such 
a solution would again outweigh the costs because there would be some 
guidelines where there are currently none. Again, the tension between the 
schools and the parents would not be resolved, but at least some of the 
interests of each would be accounted for and represented in the legislation. 
Further, this solution would ensure that for a child like Quinn, the decision 
would not come down to only two competing alternatives. Even if his 
preferred school did not meet the state standards, he and his parents would 
have additional options in finding a school that is right for him. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The education and future of many children depend on the prompt 
resolution of the issues presented throughout this article. At this point in 
time, there are no compulsory education laws for preschoolers in any state. 
Therefore, parents retain a significant interest in the education of their 
                                                        
189 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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preschool children. Despite this fact, the state still retains a significant 
interest in the education of preschool children, especially preschool children 
who require special education or related services, because of the crucial 
importance of this stage of development. This tension is ever-present and 
without an easy solution because if parents or the states are given too much 
control, the interests of the other can be quickly forgotten. Ultimately, 
parents and states need to collaborate to determine the best educational 
setting for children—so the children have the benefit of learning in a way 
that reflects the interests of each. It is too risky to grant parents complete 
control, but it is too great an infringement on the rights of parents to strip 
them of all control. The IDEA and the accompanying federal regulations 
need to contemplate this tension between parents and the state, but also the 
importance of this determination. 
In doing so, drafters should choose one of two broad options: (1) create 
national preschool standards or (2) require individual states to draft 
standards. The first option seems to be the most desirable and effective 
because it would codify a single definition of preschool for the purposes of 
the IDEA and also incentivize early childhood education reform by the fifty 
states. Additionally, national preschool standards would ensure that the 
definitions are not contradictory to other provisions of the IDEA. It simply 
makes more sense in our increasingly mobilized society to create one rule 
that can be interpreted in light of different state laws, rather than to have 
fifty rules that could be as broad or as specific as the state so chooses. 
Consider Quinn one last time. If a set of minimum national preschool 
standards were enacted before Quinn was placed on an IEP, his parents may 
not have been faced with such a complicated decision, assuming his first 
preschool met the minimum standards set out in the legislation. Quinn 
would have been able to receive services in the preschool setting he was 
used to and comfortable in. He would have been able to receive the early 
intervention and education that could have potentially had a broad impact 
on his long-term academic, social, and economic achievements. And, most 
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importantly, Quinn’s parents and other parents in similar situations could 
know before choosing that initial preschool whether they would have to 
face a tough decision like the one Quinn’s parents faced, and they would 
not have to pursue costly litigation to preserve their protected rights. 
Finally, Quinn and his parents would enter into an untainted relationship 
with the public school system in kindergarten because there would not have 
been any prior controversy. This would allow the school and Quinn’s 
parents to collaborate more effectively when meeting as a team to develop 
his IEP and when simply communicating on a day-to-day basis. 
Thus, although there will always be a very real and philosophical tension 
between the state and parents regarding the education system, that tension 
need not result in massive disruptions to the education process. The 
legislature can efficiently and effectively amend the current legislation in a 
way that will limit the negative consequences of this tension and support the 
provision of quality preschool education and services to children who 
qualify. 
